Who Needs Strong Leaders? by Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein
 
Inter-American Development Bank 
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) 
Research Department  
Departamento de Investigación 























*Inter-American Development Bank 









   2
Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the  
Inter-American Development Bank  






Who needs strong leaders? / by Alberto Chong, Mark Gradstein. 
 
p. cm.    
(Research Department Working paper series ; 628) 
Includes bibliographical references. 
 
1. Political leadership.   I. Gradstein, Mark.  II. Inter-American Development Bank. Research  
Dept.   III. Title.  IV. Series.   
 
HM161 .C47  2008 













Inter-American Development Bank 
1300 New York Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20577 
 
The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be 
attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its behalf. 
 
This paper may be freely reproduced provided credit is given to the Research Department, Inter-
American Development Bank. 
 
The Research Department (RES) produces a quarterly newsletter, IDEA (Ideas for Development 
in the Americas), as well as working papers and books on diverse economic issues. To obtain a 
complete list of RES publications, and read or download them please visit our web site at: 
http://www.iadb.org/res. 




This paper’s model suggests that a strong leader, sometimes with little legislative 
oversight, may nevertheless benefit from public support.  The argument is that 
this support is induced as an attempt by the poor to counter the subversion of 
public protection of property rights by the rich, and to achieve this goal they are 
often willing to pay the price of the leader’s diversion of tax revenues for private 
use.  The paper then examines survey data on individual attitudes toward strong 
leadership and finds their pattern to be consistent with the model’s predictions; 
specifically, support for strong leadership is inversely related to individual income 
and to countrywide income inequality. 
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1. Introduction 
 
At the end of 1990s, Russia’s economy was in transition to the market system, crony capitalism on 
the rise, the oligarchs wielding ever larger influence on the media and the politics, and corruption 
and crime all pervasive.  Whereas the debate as to whether the power of the oligarchs could be 
channeled into productive use is still ongoing (see Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005), they remained 
highly unpopular. Vladimir Putin won the 2000 presidential election by pledging an 
uncompromising law and order stance. He subsequently prosecuted several key oligarchs and 
strengthened the military and the police force, centralizing presidential power and curbing dissent 
along the way.  In 2004, he was easily reelected with the support of 71 percent of the voters, and his 
recent approval rate exceeded 80 percent, almost unprecedented for a leader of a democratic 
country. 
This episode reflects an empirically relevant aspect of political reality but one that is 
neglected in the literature: popular support for strong leaders, often with limited accountability to 
and control by the legislature.
1  Comprehensive survey data studied in detail below suggest a great 
deal of support for such leadership, apparently as a response to perceived indecisiveness and 
instability of democracies and their inability to enforce law and order. Specifically, the correlation 
between the preference for a strong leader and the opinion that democracies are not good in 
maintaining order is 0.24; the correlation between the former and the preference for having a 
democratic political system is -0.21.  Furthermore, an interesting regularity in the data is the robust 
positive relationship between income and support for democracy, and an inverse relationship 
between income and preference for a strong leader. Powerful leaders are often perceived as effective 
anti-corruption reformers and as strongmen capable of countering the power of established vested 
interests and empowering the poor masses.
2 In other cases, however, popular leaders who 
successfully did so were kept in line by the legislature; the US leadership during the Progressive era 
is one such prominent episode, which illustrates that lax legislative control is not an unavoidable 
response to domineering wealthy interests. 
This paper’s objective is to study the factors behind popular support for strong leaders. To 
do so, the paper’s stylized model stipulates that, when the leader is subject to tight oversight and 
                                                           
1 That this example is far from being unique is shown by mass support of populist leaders in Latin America, such as 
Juan Perón and Hugo Chávez, and in East Asia. 
2 Cf., “…a tyrant is chosen from the people to be their protector against the notables, and in order to prevent them 
from being injured” (Aristotle, Politics, Book V, Part X).    5
consequently is unable to appropriate a large enough share of tax revenues, she may not find it in 
her best interests to incur the cost of public enforcement of property rights. This in turn implies that 
rich individuals are able to appropriate the poor through rent seeking. It follows that the poor favor 
endowing the leader with sufficiently strong powers to divert a large share of tax revenues so as to 
provide her with incentives to impose legal enforcement, thus eliminating appropriation by the rich.  
We then use rich survey data to statistically document empirical regularities consistent with some of 
the model’s results, finding that strong leadership is favored by the poor. This income effect is 
significant and is independent of a similar effect of education on democracy. Also in line with the 
model’s implications, we find that support for strong leadership increases with a country’s income 
inequality. 
The interaction between political systems and economic outcomes has long been a subject 
of intense interest for economists. In particular, an emerging body of the literature investigates to 
what extent democracy promotes growth.
3  Whereas the focus there is on outcomes of various 
political systems, the related literature reviewed below attempts to understand their roots. Neither of 
these literatures, however, addresses a rationale behind mass support for strong leadership. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a literature overview.  
Section 3 then presents a simple theoretical framework, whose analysis is carried out in Section 4.  
Section 5 validates some of the analytical insights using a comprehensive individual survey dataset, 
and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
Several pieces of literature are related to this research.  One strand empirically compares 
economic performance under different political systems, such as between democratic and non-
democratic regimes.  An early historical study, DeLong and Shleifer (1993), finds that medieval 
cities with strong absolutist rulers tended to grow less than cities with a more diffuse distribution 
of political power. More recent work (for example, Barro, 1996, Papaioannou and Siourounis, 
2004, Przeworski and Limongi, 1993, Persson and Tabellini, 2007, Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005)   
has generated somewhat inconclusive results, some authors finding a robust beneficial growth 
                                                           
3 See Persson and Tabellini (2007), and references therein for recent contributions.  An additional branch in this 
literature, exemplified in Jones and Olken (2005, 2007) addresses the importance of a political leader’s identity for 
economic outcomes.  This work finds that leaders matter, especially in non-democratic settings. 
   6
effect of democracy, while others fail to uncover any such effect.  Also related is the more recent 
literature on the economic importance of strong leaders (e.g., Besley and Kudamatsu, 2007, and 
Jones and Olken, 2005 and 2007). This work indicates that leadership matters for economic 
performance, and more so under autocracies than under democracies (for example, Almeida and 
Ferreira, 2002, find that growth performance is more volatile under autocracies than under 
democracies). 
Theoretical underpinnings that examine the considerations behind selecting strong 
leaders from different but related perspectives have been provided in several recent 
contributions, such as Olson (1993), Grossman (2002), Konrad and Skaperdas (2005), and 
Guriev and Sonin (2007).  This work points out at some basic tradeoffs involving strong but not 
necessarily benevolent leadership. More specifically related is Paltseva (2007), where these 
tradeoffs are illustrated in a growth framework in which an autocrat decides on the devolution of 
her power, as a commitment device to promote investment. Here, in contrast, the electorate 
determines the preferred strength of the policymaking executive in order to possibly motivate the 
latter to effectively engage in enforcement. The literature on politicians’ selection focuses on the 
supply side, and its insights help understand the heterogeneity among strong leaders (the paper 
Meissner and Polborn, 2004, is particularly relevant). 
Also relevant is the issue of the determinants of preferences for democratic governance. 
For example, Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2007) emphasize education as a major 
democratization force; in contrast, Acemoglu et al. (2007), argue that the causal link is flawed 
and that, instead, omitted variables from past history affect the evolution of educational 
achievements, economic prosperity, and democratic institutions.  Much of this research has been 
conducted in the context of cross-country data, which confounds the interpretation of causality 
(see Bobba and Coviello, 2007, and references cited therein for a discussion of methodological 
difficulties).  In this paper, we take a different route and investigate the less confounded causality 
between personal characteristics and democratic attitudes, using individual survey data.  
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
 
We illustrate the basic forces at play by considering a simple model of an economy with a 
continuum of households of a unit measure indexed by i, each consisting of a parent and child,   7
that operates in time periods t.
4  In each period, there is also a leader whose potential role is to 
provide legal enforcement.  The initial level of household  i's income is exogenously given at yio, 
and the income level in period t, yit is endogenously determined.  Ft denotes the distribution of 
income in period t.  In each period, the household’s income is allocated among consumption, cit, 
productive investment, kit, and unproductive investment in rent seeking, rit.  Normalizing all 
prices to one, the budget constraint then is 
yit = cit + kit + rit   (1) 
 
It is assumed that this constraint is binding and that, because of capital market imperfections, it is 
impossible to borrow.   
  Two regimes of public property rights protection are considered.  Under the regime of 
public enforcement of property rights (PR), the amount of actual individual investment, κit, 
coincides with the amount of income allocated for that purpose, κit = kit.  It is taxed by a 
proportional income tax with the rate of T, so that tax revenues are TKt, where Kt = ∫
1
0
dj k jt  is the 
amount of aggregate investment.  A share dt, 0< dt < 1, is then diverted by the leader for her 
private consumption, and the complementary share (1-dt) is used to provide a productive public 
good, Gt,   
 
  Gt = (1-dt) TKt     (2) 
   
The production function uses the individual after-tax income and the public good to generate 
next-period income, 
 
 y it+1  = A kit (1-T) Gt
β = A kit (1-T) ((1-dt) TKt)
β,   0 < β < 1,  A > 0    (3) 
 
Alternatively, under the rent seeking regime (RS) the state does not enforce property rights, 
implying that the distribution of the aggregate investment among households is determined 
through mutual appropriation.  In particular, the share sit+1 that household i is able to retain is a 








it it    (4) 
                                                           
4 This will imply that aggregate and average values below are equivalent.   8
Then the net capital endowment, κit, is determined jointly by productive and unproductive rent 
seeking investments in asset claims as follows (see Sonin, 2003, and Gradstein, 2007): 
 
κit = sit ∫
1
0







it it  ∫
1
0
dj k jt    (5) 
Poorer households, whose opportunities of making such claims are more limited because of 
credit market imperfections, are at a disadvantage relative to richer households, which has direct 
implications for their preference for strong leadership, as will be shown below.  
  This description arguably fits well Russia’s reality in the 1990s, prior to Putin’s election 
in 2000.  Thus, Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (2003; see also Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005) 
relate how the newly rich oligarchs were able to use their influence over the legal system and the 
Parliament to consolidate their grip on business groups, and how their acquired control over the 
media served as an essential element of political influence.  This, in the view of these observers, 
resulted in the breakdown of legal institutions and the subversion of political institutions; further, 
it allowed the politically influential oligarchs to promote economic policies that were aimed not 
at enhancing economic growth, but to discriminate against smaller firms.  Indeed, Putin’s rise to 
power on the law and order platform is viewed as the public reaction to these excesses.
5 
  The economy’s production function under the rent seeking regime then is  
yit+1  = A κit (1-T) Gt







it it  ∫
1
0
dj k jt ] (1-T) ((1-dt) TKt)
β   (6)     
 
It is assumed that, in each period, in the absence of a strong leader the status quo of the rent-seeking 
regime prevails. 
Each parent’s preferences are assumed to derive from consumption and from the child’s 
income, which simplifies the analysis by making current policy choices independent of future 
expectations.  With symmetric logarithmic preferences, we write the individual household’s 
utility: 
  V(cit, yit+1) = ln(cit) + ln(yit+1)   (7) 
 
                                                           
5 As is argued in Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (2003), subversion of legal and political institutions was also 
rampant during the Gilded Age in the United States.   9
We assume that, in the absence of leadership, the rent-seeking regime prevails.  Thus, the 
citizens themselves lack the ability to eliminate that regime, even if they decided that it would be 
beneficial to do so.
6  Hence, a leader is needed to enforce property rights, and doing so entails a 
cost of Ct Δt, where Δt=1 if it is imposed and Δt=0 otherwise; it is assumed that the leader bears 
the cost.
7  Diversion of tax revenues for private gain is costly, and the cost associated with 
diverted the share of dt of tax revenues is αtdt
2/2, where 0< αt <1 determines the marginal cost of 
diversion for the leader.  The parameter αt is interpreted as the strictness of the overseeing 
control by the public.  For example, the leader’s cost could be her expected penalty, including 
non-pecuniary, which may depend on the likelihood of judicial or legislative review. 
  Assuming that the leader’s utility is linear and that the choices of the property rights 
regime and of diversion are enacted in the next period, we write it as follows: 
  u(Δt, dt) = - CtΔt + (dt - αtdt
2/2)TKt     (8)
8 
 
We will assume that the cost of eliminating rent seeking is linear in the latter’s volume, 
 
  Ct = (1-γt)Rt = (1-γt)∫
1
0
dj rjt ,  0<γt <1    (9) 
 
where 1−γt is the marginal cost of eliminating rent seeking elimination.  It may be useful, for 
example, to think of 1−γt as consisting of a constant country-specific component—reflecting, for 
example, the extent to which rent seeking is culturally entrenched, or being related to the quality 
of the judiciary, or to the country’s legal tradition—and of a variable, idiosyncratic component 
that can be interpreted as being inversely related to the leader’s ability.  For now it is assumed as 
exogenously given, but its endogenization is discussed below. 
  Note that the assumption that the leader can be disciplined by a penalty contrasts with 
much of the related literature (see, for example, Barro, 1973, and Maskin and Tirole, 2004) 
which features reelection prospects that serve as a leader’s disciplining device.  In other related 
papers (see Gradstein, 2007, and Paltseva, 2007) the policymaker represents one of the 
population’s groups and cannot divert income for private gain.  Consequently, the issue of 
imposing restraints on the policymaker does not emerge there. 
                                                           
6 Given the public good nature of the property rights protection this assumption is plausible.   
7 This assumption is stronger than needed, as the leader could be assumed to bear a portion of the cost. 
8 Assuming an ego rent utility component would also ensure that the leader derives a strictly positive utility from 
being in office.   10
  A period referring to a lifespan, there is a new leader in each period whose identity is 
revealed prior to decision-making.
9  The decision-making sequence in each period is as follows.  
Individuals first determine the strictness of the leader’s control through voting.  Then the leader 
chooses whether or not to impose the property rights regime, upon which the individual 
consumption-investment choices are made.  Then the leader selects the diversion rate and incurs 
the penalty cost as determined in the first stage.  This determines current consumption levels as 
well as future incomes.  The equilibrium consists of a mutually consistent sequence of these 
decisions.   
 
4. Equilibrium Analysis   
 
To make decisions on the preferred leader’s strength, the voters have to rationally anticipate 
future decision making; consequently, the analysis proceeds backwards.  In the last stage, the 
leader choose a diversion rate so as to maximize (8); the solution is given by dt = 1/αt, so that the 
amount of diversion is inversely related to the strictness of legislative control, and the resulting 
leader’s utility is 
u = - CtΔt + (1/2αt)TKt 
 
We then study the equilibrium consumption-investment choices for each type of institutional 
regime.  Under rent seeking, logarithmic utility along with the multiplicative production function 
implies that each individual household will allocate a constant fraction of its income to 
consumption and another fraction to each type of investment.  Specifically, maximization of the 
individual utility function (7) with respect to consumption, productive investment and rent- 
seeking outlays subject to the budget constraint (1) and the production function (6) and the 
analysis of the resulting first order conditions yields cit = kit = rit which, together with the budget 
constraint, yields the equilibrium choices: 
 
 c it
RS = yit / 3, kit
RS = rit










jt = Yt / 3 
    
where Yt is the average income level in period t. 
 Substitution  of  dt = 1/αt, as well as of kit
RS and rit
RS into the production function yields the 
future individual and aggregate income levels:  
                                                           
9 Assuming otherwise would unduly complicate the model without delivering fundamentally different insights.   11
  
yit+1









it ] (1-T) ((1-(1/αt)) T)
β (Yt /3)
1+β,  Yt+1




Further substitutions yield the utility levels 
 V it









it ] (1-T) ((1-(1/αt))T)
β (Yt /3)
1+β]}   (10) 
 
With the enforcement of property rights, individual utility maximization subject to the budget 




PR =  yit/ 2 
 
and future individual and aggregate income levels, 
yit+1
PR = A (yit/2) (1-T) ((1-(1/αt)) T)
β (Yt/2)
β , Yt+1
PR = A (1-T) ((1-(1/αt))T)
β (Yt/2)
1+β 
The corresponding utility levels are: 
 
 V it
 PR = ln(yit/2) + ln {A (yit/ 2) (1-T) ((1-(1/αt))T)
β (Yt/2)
β}   (11) 
 
We in particular observe that the utility maximizing level of the tax rate, T = β/(1+β), is identical 
across all individuals under both regimes; and this will be assumed to be the chosen tax rate.  
Also note that the individual utilities increase in the leader’s oversight within each regime.   
Clearly, as long as the leader is expected to allow the rent-seeking regime, the optimal degree of 
oversight from each individual’s viewpoint equals infinity to ensure that there is no diversion  so 
that dt = 0. 
  We then turn to the leader’s determination of whether to impose the property rights 
regime.  Her utility—correctly anticipating future consumption-investment individual choices 
and the level of diversion—is  
  u = - CtΔt + (1/2αt)TYt/2     (12) 
 
which implies that  
  αt
* = TYt /4C = 3T/[4(1-γt)]     (13)   12
 
is the maximal level of the leader’s oversight ensuring her choice of the property rights regime.  
It decreases with the marginal cost of eliminating rent seeking: to provide enough incentives to 
impose public enforcement of property rights in the context of high marginal costs, she should be 
allowed a significant amount of diversion, implying lax oversight; and the opposite holds for the 
case of small marginal costs.   
  We thus obtain two possibilities: a leader who finds the elimination of rent seeking too 
costly and cannot divert, dt=0; and a leader that implements the property rights regime, is subject 
to the oversight of αt




 = 4(1-γt)/3T   (14) 
 
  We will refer to the former as a weak leader, and to the latter as a strong leader, so that 
the distinction between the two types is solely based on their respective willingness to enforce 
public protection of property rights.  In particular, note that variation among strong leaders is 
manifested through their diversion of public resources, so that in general they can be more or less 
benign.  Further, the equilibrium amount of diversion is positively related to the marginal cost of 
eliminating rent seeking.  The reason for this is that, in an environment with a high cost of 
eliminating rent seeking, lax oversight suffices to induce the leader to provide enforcement—
which generates more diversion.  The citizens’ fundamental choice is between a weak, tightly 
controlled leader, who does not engage in legal enforcement and also does not divert, and a 
strong leader who diverts part of the tax revenues but also eliminates rent seeking through public 
enforcement of property rights. 
  Future incomes under the two scenarios, of a weak and a strong leader, respectively, can be 
written as follows: 
  yit+1









it ] (1-T) T
β (Yt /3)
1+β, yit+1
S = A (yit/ 2) (1-T) ((1-dt
*) T)
β (Yt/2)
β     (15) 
 
and the average next-period income levels are: 
  Yt+1
W = A (1-T) T
β (Yt /3)
1+β,  Yt+1
S = A (1-T) ((1- dt
*) T)
β (Yt/2)
1+β     (16)
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Several observations are in order.  First, it follows that income inequality increases, in the sense 
of Lorenz curve domination, over time under a weak leader, and is constant under a strong 
leader.
10  The former is quite consistent, for example, with the evolution of income distribution in 
Russia in the 1990s, prior to Putin’s election; see Shleifer and Treisman (2005) and Milanovic 
(1999) for a broader discussion of the rise in inequality during transition, as well as with that in 
the United States during the Gilded Age, as summarized in Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer  
(2003).  Second, comparison of average next-period incomes reveals that, while strong 
leadership reduces rent seeking and increases productive investment, thereby promoting growth, 
it also generates diversion of tax revenues, so that the results are in general ambiguous.  In 
particular, the comparison of growth rates under the two regimes hinges upon the cost associated 
with the elimination of rent seeking, a lower cost implying a faster growth rate under strong 
leadership.  Recalling that this cost contains the component of idiosyncratic leader’s ability, 
another implication is that the growth rate under strong leadership may be volatile, depending on 
the leader’s quality, which is consistent with the results in Almeida and Ferreira (2002) and 
Jones and Olken (2005, 2007). 
 Summarizing, 
 
Proposition 1.  The comparison of growth rates is ambiguous and depends on the equilibrium 
diversion; when the cost of eliminating rent seeking is small, growth performance under strong 
leadership can be better than under a weak leader, but being dependent on the leader’s qualities, 
is volatile. 
 
  The individual utilities can be written as follows: 
  Vit









it ] (1-T) T
β (Yt /3)
1+β]}   (17) 
and  
  Vit
 S = ln(yit/2) + ln {A (yit/ 2) (1-T) ((1- dt
*) T)
β (Yt/2)
β}   (18)   
 
We now turn to the determination of the support for strong as opposed to tightly controlled 
leadership by calculating the utility differential: 
                                                           
10 This follows because future income is a convex function of current income under a weak leader, but a linear one 
under a strong leader; a formal proof is available.   14
Vit
 S - Vit
 W = ln (3/2)
2+β + ln (1- dt
*)







t it ] = ln (Yt+1
S/Yt+1







t it ]   (19) 
 
This utility differential decreases with individual income, indicating an inverse relationship 
between income and preference for strong leadership.  To understand the intuition, note that 
strong leadership can be interpreted as having two effects.  One effect, on aggregate income, is 
generally ambiguous as discussed above.  Another is the redistributional effect, which—by 
enforcing public protection of property rights—benefits the poor at the expense of the rich.  It 
then follows that richer individuals favor a weak leader, whereas poor individuals favor a strong 
leader; and for all individuals, a higher equilibrium diversion—caused by low costs of 
eliminating rent seeking—implies a reduced preference for this outcome.  This is related to the 
observation in Di Tella and MacCulloch (2007) that poor citizens often perceive capitalism to 
unjustly favor capitalists who are able to tilt outcomes in their favor.  
  Thus, we have the following 
 
Proposition 2. Support for strong leadership that leads to public enforcement of property rights 
is positively related to individual income.  
 
Further, when the marginal cost of rent-seeking elimination is small, the extent of the 
leader’s oversight needed to induce enforcement is small as well, implying in turn increased 
preference by each individual for a strong leader.  If, for instance, incomes are identical, so that 
the above utility differential equals  ln (3/2)
2+β + ln (1- d t
*)
β, then a strong leader that is 
committed to the elimination of rent seeking constitutes the citizens’ choice if and only if the 
cost of doing so—implying small diversion—is small enough.
11   
 Now,  let  yt* denote the income level making an individual citizen just indifferent 
between the two options; all individuals whose income is below that level favor a strong leader, 
and the opposite for wealthier individuals.  Recalling that Ft is the distribution function of 
income, Ft(yt*) is the proportion of citizens favoring a strong leader.  We then write: 
 
                                                           
11 Note that, if a fixed-cost component in elimination of rent seeking was assumed, the level of oversight needed to 
implement enforcement would be a decreasing function of income, which, in turn, would imply that legal 
enforcement is more likely to benefit from public support in developed economies.  
   15
0 = ln (3/2)
2+β + ln (1- dt
*)









t t ] = ln (3/2)
2+β + ln (1- dt
*)








]     (20)  
where σt
2 is the variance of the income distribution in period t.   
  It follows then that the larger the variance and the smaller the cost of eliminating rent 
seeking, the larger is the cutoff income level, implying an increase in the popular support for a 
strong leader.  Intuitively, the larger is the variance of income distribution, the larger is the 
relative advantage of the rich appropriating the poor under the rent-seeking regime, enhancing 
mass support for its elimination through legal enforcement.   
  Summarizing, we obtain 
 
Proposition 3.  A higher level of income dispersion leads to an increase in the mass support for 
strong leaders. 
 
  Whether a strong or a weak leader is ultimately elected in equilibrium hinges upon the 
balance of political power.  Specifically, letting ypt denote the decisive voter’s income, a weak 
leader is elected if and only if ypt > yt*, that is, when the wealthy elite is politically decisive. 
  To conclude this section, it is worth pointing out the variation among strong leaders, in 
terms of diverted income, that the model allows for—which  directly affects the variation in the 
equilibrium degree of oversight among strong leaders.  As seen above, it is affected by the 
marginal cost of eliminating rent seeking, which in turn hinges upon the leader’s quality as well 
as upon country-wide characteristics, in particular, the quality of the judiciary and the legislative 
systems.  This implies that strong leadership may be of an autocratic style a la Perón or Putin; 
but it may also be of a benevolent kind, such as in the US of the early twentieth century, during 
the Progressive era, which likewise emerged as a response to the domination of the wealthy elite, 
the robber barons, during the Gilded Age.
12  While the above analysis does not address this 
taxonomy of leadership, insights from the recent literature on political selection suggest that 
politicians’ quality is an important consideration and that low-quality candidates may well 
populate the political arena, which then indicates high diversion by strong leaders.  To illustrate 
this possibility, in Appendix 1 we switch the focus to endogenizing the supply side of a leader’s 
                                                           
12 For example, the 1912 Progressive Party Platform includes the commitment “…to dissolve the unholy alliance 
between corrupt business and corrupt politics…”   16
selection by considering a modification of the Meissner and Polborn (2004) framework.  This 
analysis, in particular, generates the possibility of low quality of leaders, which in turn implies 
lax oversight and high diversion, as shown in the preceding analysis. 
 
5. Evidence   
 
5.1. Empirical Approach 
 
In this section we test some of the empirical implications of the theoretical model using the 
following benchmark specification:  
 
j j j j j u Z X Income Leader + + + = 3 2 1 β β β ,  J j ,..., 2 , 1 =      ( 2 1 )  
 
where Leader is the dependent variable and represents the individual preference for a strong 
leader. Based on the model above, we focus on individual income as our main variable of 
interest. Our benchmark specification also includes additional individual-level explanatory 
variables, represented by vector X, and country-level explanatory variables, represented by 
vector Z; u is the error term.  We estimate the coefficients β1, β2, β3, where the latter two are 
vectors.  Whereas we are primarily interested in the relationship between income and preference 
for strong leadership, for robustness purposes we also employ a similar specification with a set of 
dependent variables related to individual preferences of democratic governance, estimating the 
above equation with Democ replacing Leader in the above equation, where Democ alternately 
consists of five proxies in this regard. 
  The data come from the World Value Survey (WVS), a worldwide survey carried out by 
the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) that consists of 
individual cross-national questions on a wide variety of topics, such as the economy, politics, 
foreign policy, and identity, as well as on socio-economic background of individual respondents 
and his or her attitudes on several topics. Data come from face to face interviews with a sampling 
universe of adult citizens 15 years old and older from over 70 developed and developing 
countries.
13 Our sample is composed of tens of thousands of individuals who were surveyed in 
                                                           
13 The countries and number of firms included in our sample are Albania (1,000), Algeria (1,282), Argentina 
(1,280), Austria (1,522), Bangladesh (1,500), Belgium (1,912), Bulgaria (1,000), Belarus (1,000), Canada (1,931), 
Chile (1,200), China (1,000), Croatia (1,003), Czech Republic (1,908), Denmark (1,023), Estonia  (1,005), Finland 
(1,038), France (1,615), Greece (1,142), Hungary (1,000), Iceland (968), India (2,002), Indonesia (1,004), Iran 
(Republic of Islamic) (2,532), Iraq (2,325), Ireland (1,012), Israel (1,199), Italy (2,000), Japan (1,362), Jordan   17
the fourth wave, during 1997-2004. All the dependent variables used in this paper are categorical 
and thus the coefficients are estimated using Ordered Probits.
14  Additionally, all regressions 
have robust standard errors and have been clustered either at the regional level (when including 
country dummies) or at the country level (when including country-level controls, namely, the 
Gini coefficient). 
  The definitions of all the variables used in the paper are described in Table 1, Table 2 
contains descriptive statistics, and Table 3 presents a correlation matrix with corresponding p-
values.   
     
5.2. Results 
 
Our main result appears in the first column in Table 4, where a statistically significant negative 
link is exhibited between individual income, as measured at the household level, and preference 
for a strong leader.  To address a potential concern that this may be driven by the effect of 
education (the link between education and democracy features in the related literature; see 
Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007, and references therein), the second column also includes 
the education variable.  While this causes a reduction in the coefficient of the income variable, 
that coefficient remains significant.
15  
  We also include country-level Gini coefficients in our regressions and find that there is a 
positive and statistically significant link with preference for a strong leader. As predicted by the 
model, in countries with high income inequality, the preference for a strong leader is greater, as 
shown in the third column of Table 4.
16  (Notice that in this specification education loses 
statistical significance.)
17    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(1,223), Republic of Korea (1,200), Kyrgyzstan (1,043), Latvia (1,013), Lithuania (1,018), Luxembourg (1,211), 
Malta (1,002), Mexico (1,535), Republic of Moldova (1,008), Morocco (2,264), Netherlands (1,003), Nigeria 
(2,022), Pakistan (2,000), Peru (1,501), Philippines (1,200), Poland (1,095), Portugal (1,000), Puerto Rico (720), 
Romania (1,146), Russian Federation (2,500), Saudi Arabia (1,502), Singapore (1,512), Slovakia (1,331), Vietnam 
(1,000), Slovenia (1,006), South Africa (3,000), Zimbabwe (1,002), Spain (2,409), Sweden (1,015), Turkey (4,607), 
Uganda (1,002), Ukraine (1,195), Republic of  Macedonia (1,055), Egypt (3,000), Great Britain (1,000), United 
Republic of Tanzania (1,171), United States (1,200), Venezuela (1,200), Germany West (1,037), Germany East 
(999), Northern Ireland (1,000), Serbia (1,200), Montenegro (1,060), Serbian Republic of Bosnia (400) and Bosnia 
Federation (800). 
14 Ordinary least squares were also estimated. Results are analogous. 
15 Marginal effects for our variable of interest are shown in Appendix 2. 
16 For the sake of economy we do not present marginal effects, but they may be provided upon request. 
17 Whereas it seems very unlikely that endogeneity between income and preference for a strong leader may be an 
issue, such a possibility cannot be ruled out completely. We follow Acemoglu et al. (2007) who use savings as an 
instrument for education to explain democracy. In the first stage we apply a linear probability model on income and 
use as instrument the five-year gross average country savings prior to the year of the survey and include the labor   18
  Inclusion of additional controls that have been used in a related paper, Di Tella and 
McCulloch (2007)—age, age squared, age at which education was completed, employment 
status, and the self-positioning in the political scale—does not change the results, and in 
particular, our key variable of interest remains statistically significant at conventional levels; 
also, the inclusion of the Gini coefficient yields similar results as before, as shown in Table 5.
18  
  Table 6 presents additional evidence pertaining to various proxies of the preferences for 
tightness of legislative control, as captured by the approval of democracy.  In particular, we find 
that the coefficient of income is (i) positive and statistically significant with respect to a 
preference for a democratic political system; (ii) negative and statistically significant with 
respect to the idea that economic systems run badly in democracies; (iii) negative and 
statistically significant with respect to the opinion that says democracies are indecisive and have 
too much squabbling; (iv) negative and statistically significant with respect to the statement that 
says democracies are not good at maintaining order; and (v) positive and statistically significant 
with respect to the idea that says that democracies may have problems but are better systems. 
Summarizing, therefore, the higher the individual’s income, the more supportive she is of 
democratic governance.
19   
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
 
Recent work has emphasized the importance of governance for economic performance.  A 
seemingly important governance feature is the degree of legislative foresight over elected 
leadership.  While democracy often assumes a substantial extent of oversight, the examples of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
status as an individual-level instrument. Income yields a negative coefficient, which is statistically significant further 
confirming the main prediction of the model. Also, since the model generates endogenous income inequality we use 
religion and legal origin as instruments for inequality, see Appendix 3. As an alternative instrument we also use 
individual savings from WVS. While results are somewhat weaker, they do not change the key findings of the paper. 
These latter results as well as IV findings using the extended specifications of Table 5 are available upon request.   
18 Sala-i-Martín (1997) develops a robustness test by looking at the entire distribution of the estimator of the variable 
of interest by focusing on the fraction of the density function lying on each side of zero. If 95 percent of the density 
function for the estimates of the coefficient of interest lies to the right of zero, one could say that this variable is 
more likely to be correlated with our dependent variable.  We systematically augment our benchmark specification 
by using a pool of ten additional variables, included three at a time, in all the possible combinations. We compute 
the coefficient estimates, its variance, the integrated likelihood, and the cdf(0) for each regression and compute the 
aggregate cdf(0) of our coefficient of interest as the weighted average of all individual cdf(0)s. Income is said to be 
robust if the weighted cdf(0), is greater than or equal to 0.90. Applying this methodology we find that robustness at 
6.4 percent. Results may be provided upon request. 
19 We repeat the exercise using instrumental variables along the lines of the estimations performed in the case of 
strong leader. The results are similar to the case of Table 6 with the exception of the statement that says that   19
democratically elected strong leaders, sometimes endowed with autocratic powers, suggest 
existence of significant variation in this regard.  Yet, existing work has neglected this aspect. 
  This paper’s model argues that a popular demand for a strong leader with little legislative 
oversight is likely to emerge in a context of weak public protection of property rights, whereby 
the rich elites can expropriate the poor.  While lax oversight causes diversion of public resources 
by the leader, it also provides him with incentives to restrain the rent-seeking advantage of the 
rich, thereby increasing investments and in turn generating perceived benefits for the poor.   
Further, it is shown that mass support for strong leaders is larger the less equal the distribution of 
income.  Empirical support for the theory is provided by studying individual-level survey data 
that contain questions about the support for strong leadership and for democratic governance.  
Consistent with the model, it is found that individual income is inversely related to a strong 
leader’s support.  More specifically, the poor tend to be relatively more supportive of strong 
leadership and more suspicious of democracy than the rich, and this effect is shown to be 
independent of the education effect on pro-democratic attitudes.  
  An alternative view of why strong leaders often benefit from public support is that their 
subsequent diversion could not be fully anticipated by myopic voters.  There are two problems 
with this view, however.  First, it may be difficult to reconcile with forward-looking rational 
voting behavior.  Further, it is not clear how this alternative theory would give rise to the 
empirically observed inverse relationship between individual incomes and support for strong 
leaders. 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
democracies may have problems but are better systems, which yields no statistically significant link. The results are 
shown in Appendix 4.   20
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Preference for a strong 
leader 
Some people favor, and others are against, having a strong leader in their country. The 
question in the survey is as follows: Would you say it is a (1) very good, (2) fairly good, 
(3) bad or (4) very bad way of governing this country having a strong leader who does not 
have to bother with a parliament and elections. Data is from the fourth wave of the survey 
(1997-2004). This variable scale was changed to: (1) very bad – (4) very good.  Source:
World Value Surveys (various years). 
Approval of a democratic 
political system 
The question in the survey is as follows: Would you say it is a (1) very good, (2) fairly 
good, (3) bad or (4) very bad way of governing this country having a democratic political 
system. Data is from the fourth wave of the survey (1997-2004). This variable scale was 
changed to: (1) very bad – (4) very good.  Source: World Value Surveys (various years) 
Agreement with opinion that 
says that in democracy 
economic system runs badly 
The question in the survey is: Could you please tell me if you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, 
(3) disagree or (4) strongly disagree with this statement “In democracy economic system 
runs badly”. Data is from the fourth wave of the survey (1997-2004). This variable scale 
was changed to: (1) strongly disagree – (4) agree strongly.  Source: World Value Surveys 
(various years) 
Agreement with opinion that 
says that democracies are 
indecisive and have too 
much quibbling 
The question in the survey is: Could you please tell me if you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, 
(3) disagree or (4) strongly disagree whit this statement “Democracies are indecisive and 
have too much quibbling”. Data is from the fourth wave of the survey (1997-2004). This 
variable scale was changed to: (1) strongly disagree – (4) agree strongly.  Source: World 
Value Surveys (various years). 
Agreement with opinion that 
says that democracies aren't 
good at maintaining order 
The question in the survey is: Could you please tell me if you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, 
(3) disagree or (4) strongly disagree whit this statement “Democracies aren't good at 
maintaining order”. Data is from the fourth wave of the survey (1997-2004). This variable 
scale was changed to: (1) strongly disagree – (4) agree strongly. Source: World Value 
Surveys (various years). 
Agreement with the opinion 
that says that democracy 
may have problems but is 
better 
The question in the survey is: Could you please tell me if you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, 
(3) disagree or (4) strongly disagree whit this statement “Democracy may have problems 
but is better than any other form of government”. Data is from the fourth wave of the 
survey (1997-2004). This variable scale was changed to: (1) strongly disagree – (4) agree 
strongly.  Source: World Value Surveys (various years). 
Income   A scale of incomes in which the household falls into, before taxes and other deductions. 
This variable takes values from 1 to 10, 1 being the lowest decile and 10 the highest. The 
data is recollected in local currency, scaled and then aggregated so the deciles represent a 
country level income ranking.  Source: World Value Surveys (various years). 
Education 
 
The exact question in the survey is: What is the highest educational level that you have 
attained? (1) Inadequately completed elementary education, (2) Completed (compulsory) 
elementary education, (3) Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type, (4) 
Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type, (5) Incomplete secondary: 
university-preparatory, (6) Complete secondary: university-preparatory, (7) Some 
university without degree/higher education, (8) University with degree/higher education. 
This variable was changed to one with pseudo years of education, according to each level. 
Source: World Value Surveys (various years). 
Age Respondent’s  age.  Source: World Value Surveys (various years). 
Age  –  complete  education  The age at which the respondent finished full-time education. Source: World Value 
Surveys (various years). 
Gender  Gender of the respondent. (1) Female and (0) Male. Source: World Value Surveys (various 
years).    24
 
Marital status  4 dummies: (1) Married or living together as married, (2) Divorced, separated or widowed, 
and (3) Single. In all the regressions (3) is the omitted dummy. Source: World Value 
Surveys (various years). 
Work status  Labor status composed of 6 dummies: (1) Employed (Part or full time), (2) Self-employed, 
(3) Retired/pensioned, (4) Housewife not otherwise employed, (5) Student, and (6) 
Unemployed. In all the regressions, dummy (1) is omitted. Source: World Value Surveys 
(various years). 
Self-positioning in political 
scale 
How the respondent place his/her views on the scale from (1) Left to (10) Right.  Source:
World Value Surveys (various years). 
Country-Level  Data 
Gini  The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals 
or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini 
index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. 
Data is from the last year available for each country. Source: World Development 
Indicators  (2007). 
Savings  Gross savings (% of GDP). Data is the mean of the last five years for each country. 
Source: World Development Indicators  (2007). 
Region  Region in which each country falls into: Africa, Asia, North America and Europe, Middle 
East and North Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Source: World Development 
Indicators  (2007). 
Religion Identifies  the  percentage  of the population of each country that belonged to Catholic, 
Muslim or Protestant religion in 1980. For countries of recent formation, the data is 
available for 1990-95. Source: La Porta et. al. (1999) 
Legal origin   Dummies that identify the origin of the commercial law of a country. Each variable equals 
one if it is French, Scandinavian or German Common Law (and zero otherwise), 
respectively. English Common Law is the omitted dummy. Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
Labor productivity  Defined as output per unit of labor input (persons employed). Source: ILO (2005)   25
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Preference for a strong leader  76,878  2.12  1.03  1  4 
Preference for a democratic 
political system 
72,927 3.39 0.72  1  4 
In democracy economic system 
runs badly 
67,339 2.24 0.79  1  4 
Democracies are indecisive and 
have too much squabbling 
68,275 2.48 0.83  1  4 
Democracies aren't good at 
maintaining order 
68,507 2.25 0.82  1  4 
Democracy may have problems 
but is better 
70,117 3.27 0.75  1  4 
Income 76,878  4.69  2.40  1  10 
Education 76,297  10.58  4.13  3  16 
Age 76,755  41.08  15.94  15  98 
Age - complete education  66,356  19.13  5.65  3  97 
Gender: female  76,878  0.50  0.50  0  1 
Marital stat: married  76,878  0.63  0.48  0  1 
Marital stat: divorced, separated 
or widow 
76,878 0.12 0.32  0  1 
Work status: unemployed  76,248  0.09  0.29  0  1 
Work status: Self-employed  76,248  0.10  0.30  0  1 
Work status: Retired  76,248  0.14  0.34  0  1 
Work status: Student  76,248  0.07  0.26  0  1 
Work status: Housewife  76,248  0.14  0.35  0  1 
Self positioning in political scale  57,029  5.63  2.37  1  10 
Gini Coefficient  57,721  37.05  9.11  25  58 
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Table 3. Pairwise Correlations 
 
 Preference  for  a 
strong leader 







indecisive and have 
too much squabbling 
Democracies 





but it is better 
-0.1038 0.0768 -0.1154  -0.1053  -0.1047  0.0547  Income 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
-0.068 0.0518 -0.077  -0.0662 -0.0824  0.0355  Education 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.0011 -0.0123 0.0176  0.0405  0.0413  0.0393  Age 
(0.738) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
-0.0863 0.0809 -0.0712  -0.0661  -0.0762  0.0454  Age - complete education 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.0019 -0.0413 0.0438  0.0133  0.0272  -0.0291  Gender: female 
(0.571) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.0243 0.0095  -0.0089 -0.0165 -0.0023  0.0215  Marital stat: married 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.011)  (0.000)  (0.514)  (0.000) 
0.0131 -0.0471 0.0424  0.0516  0.0458  -0.0085  Marital stat: divorced, 
separated or widow  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012) 
0.0386 -0.027 0.0401  0.0219  0.0268  -0.0215  Work status: unemployed 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.0007 0.0282 -0.014  -0.0074 -0.0027  -0.0042  Work status: Self-employed 
(0.837) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.034)  (0.434)  (0.222) 
0.0105 -0.0269 0.0346  0.0611  0.0527  0.0111  Work status: Retired 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
-0.0141 0.0312 -0.0142  -0.0133  -0.0245  -0.0091  Work status: Student 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.008) 
0.0295 -0.0056 0.0157  -0.0134  0.0132  -0.0083  Work status: House wife 
(0.000) (0.097) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.015) 
0.0897 0.0206 -0.0208 -0.0118  0.0093  0.0245  Self positioning in political 
scale  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.019)  (0.000) 
0.1057 -0.0156 0.0728  0.0498  0.055  -0.1002  Gini Coefficient 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   27
Table 4. Ordered Probits: Preference for a Strong Leader 
 
Dependent Variable: Preference for a Strong Leader 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
           
Income -0.035  -0.021  -0.039 
 (0.008)***  (0.004)***  (0.016)** 
Education     -0.026  -0.001 
     (0.010)**  (0.009) 
Gender: female  0.004  -0.002  0.03 
 (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.013)** 
Marital status: married  0.047  0.008  0.099  
 (0.017)***  (0.018)  (0.033)*** 
0.074 0.025 0.09  Marital status: divorced, 
separated or widow  (0.011)*** (0.010)**  (0.062) 
Gini Coefficient       0.013 
       (0.005)** 
Observations 76878  76297  57229 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.09  0.09  0.01 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  All regressions include country dummies and standard 
errors adjusted for clustering by region with the exception of (3) which includes clustering at the 
country level, only as it has a country-level control and thus, country dummies cannot be included.  
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Table 5. Ordered Probits: Preference for a Strong Leader 
 
 Dependent  variable:  Preference for a Strong Leader 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
-0.023 -0.038  -0.03  -0.035  Income 
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)***  (0.014)** 
-0.031    -0.011  Education 
(0.008)***     (0.008) 
-0.011 -0.012  -0.01  -0.003  Age 
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)***  (0.002)** 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001    Age squared 
(0.00001)*** (0.00001)*** (0.00001)***   
   -0.017    Age - complete education 
   (0.004)***   
-0.007 -0.008 -0.014 0.003  Gender: female 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.034) 
0.083 0.101 0.072 0.139  Marital stat: married 
(0.025)*** (0.024)*** (0.019)*** (0.027)*** 
0.09  0.104 0.083 0.101  Marital stat: divorced, 
separated or widow  (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.019)***  (0.045)** 
0.053 0.071 0.061 0.071  Work status: unemployed 
(0.024)** (0.027)*** (0.026)**  -0.057 
-0.042 -0.016 -0.038 -0.015  Work status: Self-employed 
(0.029) (0.028)  (0.021)*  (0.054) 
0.039 0.04 0.029  0.088  Work status: Retired 
(0.017)** (0.008)***  (0.016)*  (0.038)** 
-0.067 -0.07  -0.04 -0.016  Work status: Student 
(0.048) (0.052) (0.041) (0.049) 
0.009 0.058  0.03  0.119  Work status: Housewife 
(0.034) (0.021)*** (0.030)  (0.097) 
    0.013  Gini coefficient 
    (0.006)** 
0.02  0.022 0.022 0.031  Self positioning in political 
scale  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)***  -0.022 
Observations  56043 56506 50337 42292 
Pseudo  R-Squared  0.10 0.09 0.09 0.01 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. For regressions (1), (2) and (3), standard errors adjusted for 
clustering by region and each includes country dummies. In the case of (4), standard errors were adjusted 
clustering by country. * Significant at ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one 
percent.    29
Table 6. Ordered Probits: Opinions of Democracy  
       
  Dependent variables 
 
Preference for a democratic 
political system 
In democracy economic 
system runs badly 
Democracies are indecisive 
and have too much 
squabbling 
Democracies are not 
good at maintaining 
order 
Democracy may have 
problems but it is better 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
0.042 0.027 -0.049  -0.037  -0.043  -0.034 -0.043 -0.03 0.037 0.025  Income 
(0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.010)***  (0.007)*** (0.011)***  (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.012)***  (0.010)** 
   0.027    -0.022     -0.016    -0.025     0.022  Education 
   (0.008)***    (0.009)**     (0.010)    (0.009)***     (0.007)*** 
-0.087 -0.08 0.088  0.084  0.01 0.006 0.045  0.038  -0.071  -0.066  Gender: female 
(0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)***  (0.014)***  (0.006)*  (0.005)  (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.012)*** (0.014)*** 
0.013 0.057 0.031  -0.002  0.029  0.006  0.052 0.014 0.062 0.096  Marital status: married 
(0.014) (0.018)*** (0.022)  (0.016) (0.034)  (0.024) (0.026)**  (0.022)  (0.010)***  (0.011)*** 
0.007 0.058 0.056  0.015  0.082  0.054  0.091 0.046 0.081 0.122  Marital status: 
divorced, separated or 
widow (0.019)  (0.026)**  (0.010)***  (0.014)  (0.014)*** (0.005)*** (0.014)***  (0.014)*** (0.017)*** (0.022)*** 
Observations  76926  76379  72162  71639 73255  72725  73465 72938 75678 75136 
Pseudo  R-Squared 0.06 0.06 0.04  0.04 0.04  0.04  0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. For all the regressions standard errors adjusted for clustering by region and each one includes country dummies. * Significant 
at ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent.  
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Appendix 1.  Endogenization of Leaders’  Quality 
 
Suppose that there are two potential candidates for leadership who differ in their quality, 1-γ
J, J = 
L, H, where γ
H > γ
L.
20  The candidates first decide whether to compete for leadership; following 
Meissner and Polborn (2004) this is assumed to be costless.  In case no one has entered the 
contest, their respective payoffs are normalized to zero.   If only one of them, candidate J, enters, 
she becomes the leader, in which case her utility is U
J = f(γ
J) + σ
J  + u, where u is given by (8).  
σ
 J is the net psychic value of being in power; it can also be negative to reflect the possibility that 
the cost outweighs the ego rents of leadership.  We assume that σ
 J and σ
 -J are only privately 
known and are identically independently distributed according to the cdf G. The utility of the 
other candidate then is U
-J = f(γ
J), f'>0.  Thus, the “stay-out” candidate also benefits from the 
leader’s decision; this is the case, for example, if both candidates value social welfare, which 
increases with the leader’s quality. 
  If both candidates enter, voting takes place.  Since individuals’ utilities decrease with 
diversion, or increase with the leader's quality, all prefer the higher-quality candidate, so that γ
H 
wins.  We let p
J denote the probability of candidate J entering the contest.  After the identity of 
the leader has been determined as above, the rest of the decision-making follows as in the 
preceding analysis.  In particular, we note that because the tightness of legislative control is set 
so as to make the leader just indifferent between enforcing public protection of property rights 
and not, u = 0. 
 If  candidate  L stays out, her payoff is f(γ
H) if H enters and zero otherwise, whereas if she 
enters her utility is f(γ
H) if candidate H enters (and wins) or f(γ
L) + σ
L if H stays out.  Thus, L 
always enters.
21  If H enters she wins, and her payoff is f(γ
H) + σ
H; if she stays away, her payoff 
is f(γ





L), or  σ
H > f(γ
L) - f(γ
H)     
 
Additionally, we have p
H = 1 – G(f(γ
L) - f(γ
H)), and p
L = 1, which pins down the Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium.  With the probability 1- p
H = G(f(γ
L) - f(γ
H)) no entry by high quality candidates 
takes place, and a low quality candidate become the leader.  The basic intuition here is that 
                                                           
20 We omit time subscripts for notational brevity and refer to γ as fully capturing leader’s quality.  Also, an extension 
to more than two candidates is straightforward. 
21 It is assumed that the support of G exceeds –f(γ
L).   31
leadership entails a public good element, but may be burdensome.  Knowing that they are certain 
to lose the contest, low-quality candidates are less reluctant to enter and to risk assuming the 
leadership burden than high-quality candidates.  
  We thus obtain 
 
Proposition 4.  Low-quality candidates always enter the contest and become leaders provided 
that high-quality candidates refrain from entering. 
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Appendix 2. Marginal Effects of Benchmark Specification 
 
 
Dependent variable:  
Preference for a Strong Leader 
 
Very bad  Bad  Fairly 
good  Very good 
   Ordered probit 
Income 0.0075  -0.0001  -0.0039  -0.0036 
Education 0.0092  -0.0001  -0.0048  -0.0044 
Gender: female  0.0008  0.0000  -0.0004  -0.0004 
Marital status: married  -0.0029  0.0000  0.0015  0.0014 
Marital status: divorced, 
separated or widow 
-0.0090 0.0000  0.0047  0.0043 
  Ordered probit with IV 
Income 0.0280  0.0008  -0.0148  -0.0140 
Education 0.0027  0.0001  -0.0014  -0.0013 
Gender: female  -0.0012  0.0000  0.0006  0.0006 
Marital status: married  -0.0169  -0.0004  0.0090  0.0084 
Marital status: divorced, 
separated or widow 
-0.0009 0.0000  0.0005  0.0005 
 
Marginal effects based on benchmark specification, namely, column 2 in Table 4. Marginal 
effects (dy/dx) test discrete change of a dummy variable from 0 to 1. Country dummies are 
included in all the regressions. Standard errors are robust and adjusted for clustering by 
region.  In the ordered probit with instrumental variables, the first stage is a lineal probability 
model for income (or/and education). The instruments used were labor status dummies and the 
average country savings the previous five years.    33
Appendix 3. IV Ordered Probits:  
Preference for Strong Leader 
 
  Ordered Probit with IV 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
           
Income -0.09  -0.079  -0.177 
 (0.022)***  (0.033)**  (0.074)** 
Education     -0.008  0.086 
     (0.015)  -0.067 
Gender: women  0.005  0.003  0.039 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.018)** 
Marital stat: married  0.058  0.048  0.234 
 (0.016)***  (0.035)  (0.111)** 
0.007 0.003  0.135  Marital stat: divorced, 
separated or widow  (0.011)  (0.015)  -0.165 
Gini coefficient       0.018 
        (0.010)* 
Observations 69229  68734  55165 
Pseudo R2  0.09  0.09  0.00 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  All regressions include country dummies and standard errors 
adjusted for clustering by region with the exception of (3) which includes clustering at the country level, 
only as it has a country-level control and thus, country dummies cannot be included.  In the ordered probit 
with instrumental variables, the first stage was estimated using a lineal probability model where exclusion 
restriction is met. The instruments used were individual work status dummies: unemployed, self-employed, 
retired, student and housewife (omitted: employed) and the average country savings the previous five years. 
In regression (3), the Gini coefficient was also instrumentalized with religion and legal origin. * Significant 
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Appendix 4. IV Ordered Probits :   
Opinion of Democracy 
 
  Dependent variables 
 
Preference for a 
democratic political 
system 
In democracy economic 
system runs badly 
Democracies are 
indecisive and have 
too much squabbling 
Democracies aren't good at 
maintaining order 
Democracy may have 
problems but it is better 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8)  (9) (10) 
0.052  0.05  -0.108  -0.154 -0.100  -0.137 -0.119  -0.105  0.032  0.021  Income 
(0.021)** (0.060) (0.035)*** (0.074)**  (0.057)*  (0.074)*  (0.043)***  (0.039)*** (0.021)  (0.061) 
   0.001    0.03     0.024    -0.009     0.008  Education 
   (0.026)    (0.026)     (0.014)*    (0.009)     (0.026) 
-0.091 -0.09  0.087  0.09  0.00  0.002 0.036  0.034  -0.078 -0.077  Gender: 
female  (0.013)**
*  (0.014)*** (0.016)***  (0.017)***  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.014)*** (0.017)*** 
0.001  0.005 0.036  0.084  0.034  0.073  0.066 0.051 0.054 0.067  Marital 
status: 
married  (0.012)  (0.044)  (0.018)*  (0.059)  (0.031) (0.051) (0.020)*** (0.027)* (0.005)***  (0.042) 




widow  (0.034) (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.019) (0.045)  (0.040) (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.022)***  (0.014)*** 
Observations  69387 68919  65226  64770 66192  65730 66353  65895  68338  67870 
Pseudo R-
Squared  0.06 0.06  0.03  0.03 0.04  0.04 0.04  0.04  0.06  0.06 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  All regressions include country dummies and robust standard errors adjusted for 
clustering by region.  The first stage was estimated using a linear probability model where exclusion restriction is met. The 
instruments used were individual work status dummies: unemployed, self-employed, retired, student and housewife (omitted: 
employed) and the average country savings the previous five years. * Significant at ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** 
significant at one percent 